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Abstract
The Indian government has taken a number of incremental measures to liberalize legal and administrative
impediments to international capital movements in recent years. This paper analyzes the extent to which the
effectiveness of capital controls in India, measured by the domestic less net foreign interest rate differential
(deviations from covered interest rate parity) have changed over time. We utilize the 3-month offshore
non-deliverable forward (NDF) market to measure the effective foreign interest rate (implied NDF yield).
Using the self exciting threshold autoregression (SETAR) methodology, we estimate a no-arbitrage band
width whose boundaries are determined by transactions costs and capital controls. Inside of the bands, small
deviations from CIP follow a random walk process. Outside the bands, profitable arbitrage opportunities exist
and we estimate an adjustment process back towards the boundaries. We allow for asymmetric boundaries
and asymmetric speeds of adjustment (above and below the band thresholds), which may vary depending
on how arbitrage activity is constrained by capital controls. We test for structural breaks, identify three
distinct periods, and estimate these parameters over each sub-sample in order to capture the de facto effect of
changes in capital controls over time. We find that de facto capital control barriers: (1) are asymmetric over
inflows and outflows, (2) have changed over time from primarily restricting outflows to effectively restricting
inflows (measured by band widths and positions); (3) arbitrage activity closes deviations from CIP when
the threshold boundaries are exceeded in all sub-samples. In recent years, capital controls have been more
symmetric over capital inflows and outflows and the deviations from CIP outside the boundaries are closed
more quickly.
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Delhi, India for their valuable input regarding earlier drafts of this work, especially Robert McCauley, Ila Patnaik
, Sergio Schmukler, Ajay Shah and Matthieu Stigler. Funding for this project from the NIPFP-DEA Program on
Capital Flows and their Consequences is gratefully acknowledged.
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1 Introduction
In the 1980s, India began to liberalize its economy to increase its market orientation. Market-
oriented reforms were expanded beginning in 1991, after a balance of payments crisis and a rapid
economic expansion supported by expansionary fiscal policy and current account deficits. Key
components of the reforms were removal of government licensing controls on domestic industrial
activity and trade liberalization. Trade liberalization reduced tariffs dramatically and replaced
quantitative trade restrictions with tariffs.
As a complement to the trade liberalization, effective current account liberalization, as measured
by acceptance of IMF Article VIII was achieved by August 1994. However, Indian policy-makers
have proceeded with caution in liberalizing capital flows as there is less theoretical agreement
on the economic benefits of capital account liberalization, and in light of the recent externally-
triggered financial crises in emerging economies. Various steps have been taken liberalize the
capital account and to allow certain kinds of foreign capital flows, but a host of restrictions and
discretionary controls remain. In fact, according to the popular Chinn-Ito (2007) index of capital
account openness, which relies on measured de jure controls, India remains one of the most closed
economies on the capital account, scoring the second lowest score on the index in the year 20061.
In this paper we examine the de facto effects of India capital account liberalization by measur-
ing deviations from covered interest parity (CIP) over time. An extensive literature investigates
deviations from CIP, inferring market segmentation to capital controls, transactions costs and other
institutional impediments to arbitrage. Studies that have estimated deviations from CIP as an in-
dication of international financial market integration in various contexts include Frankel and Levich
1China, Turkey, Pakistan and South Africa were other emerging markets that had the same score as India in 2006,
the last for which Chinn-Ito rankings are available.
1
(1975), Taylor (1989), Frankel (1991) and others. Our approach follows one strand of this litera-
ture by measuring a no-arbitrage band for small deviations from CIP where the upper and lower
threshold points are determined by the intensity of capital controls and transaction costs. Within
the bands, we expect deviations from CIP to be random, and outside the bands we expect arbitrage
(profit opportunities) pressures to systemically return deviations to the band thresholds. We divide
the sample into pre- and post-liberalization periods to examine the effects of liberalization on the
threshold boundaries of the no-arbitrage band and speeds of adjustment. A narrowing of the bands
over time is an indication of greater de facto capital account openness, as is an increase in the speed
of adjustment to the band threshold points (indicating arbitrage acts more rapidly in returning the
market closer to CIP).
A central problem in estimating bands and adjustment speeds is that it requires a non-linear
estimation methodology. An innovation of our work is to employ the self exciting threshold auto-
regressions (SETAR) methodology in order to obtain consistent estimates of the upper and lower
threshold points of the no-arbitrage band, as well as estimates of the speeds of adjustment (possibly
asymmetric) to the boundaries. The SETAR model is a particular class of piece-wise autoregressive
models and may be seen as a parsimonious approximation of a general non-linear autoregressive
model (Hansen, 1999). Another distinguishing feature of our empirical work is to measure the CIP
relationship using the net foreign interest rate from the implied yield derived from the off-shore
non-deliverable forward rate (NDF) and the LIBOR dollar interest rate. The off-shore NDF rate is
a market determined forward rate free of capital controls and the implied yield represents the net
covered rate of return that would be available on Indian short-term financial instruments in the
absence of capital controls. The domestic onshore rate to which the implied NDF yield in compared
is the Mumbai Interbank Offer Rate (MIBOR). We consider one- and three-month maturities.
2
Ma et al. (2004) and Misra and Behera (2006) have examined variations in deviations from CIP
arbitrage conditions in India over time using simple summary statistics and qualitative methods,
but not with more formal statistical modeling. They find that smaller deviations from covered
interest parity are an indication of greater capital account openness since the advent of India’s
capital control liberalization. Pasricha (2007), investigating interest rate differentials, also finds
that India is de facto more open than de jure measures such as the Chinn-Ito index suggest.
The next section discusses the liberalization of capital controls in India and the development of
the NDF market. Section 3 presents some summary and preliminary analysis of the data, including
unit root tests, and investigates structural change in the speed by which deviations from CIP
reduced in the context of linear autoregressive models. Section 4 presents the SETAR non-linear
model and reports our main empirical results, i.e. estimates of the upper and lower threshold points
of the no-arbitrage bands and the speed of adjustment to bands. Section 5 presents our conclusions.
2 Non-Deliverable Forward Markets and Covered Interest Parity
2.1 Capital Account Liberalization in India
While measures aimed at current account convertibility in India were implemented early in the
reform process, there was concern about possible linkages between capital account and current
account transactions, such as capital outflows masked as current account transactions through mis-
invoicing. As a result, certain foreign exchange regulations stayed in place, including requirements
for repatriation and surrender of export proceeds (allowing some fraction to be retained in foreign
currency accounts in India for approved uses), restrictions on dealers and documentation for selling
foreign exchange for current account transactions, and various indicative limits on foreign exchange
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purchases to meet different kinds of current account transactions2.
In 1997, a government-appointed committee on Capital Account Convertibility (CAC) provided
a road map for liberalization of capital transactions. The committee’s report emphasized various
domestic policy measures and changes in the institutional framework as preconditions for full CAC.
These included fiscal consolidation, low inflation, adequate foreign exchange reserves, and devel-
opment of a more robust domestic financial system. On the matter of the exchange rate regime,
however, the report did not squarely tackle the issue of the ‘impossible trinity,’ and the challenge
of managing domestic monetary policy and an effectively pegged exchange rate in the face of large
foreign capital flows has plagued the RBI in recent years. While the Asian crisis and subsequent
contagion that spread through 1997-98 derailed the committee’s recommended timetable, signifi-
cant liberalization of the capital account has occurred in the last decade, particularly with respect
to inward foreign investment, aided in part by improved macroeconomic indicators and financial
sector reform. As pointed out by Shah and Patnaik (2005), the easing of capital controls, partic-
ularly on portfolio inflows, has been a series of small changes, within a continuing web of detailed
quantitative restrictions operated by the RBI. Similar complex restrictions apply to FDI inflows.
There are also restrictions on outflows, including external commercial borrowing, and these re-
strictions have fluctuated over time (sometimes easing, sometimes tightening). Furthermore, as
noted by Shah and Patnaik (2005), foreign investment in bonds remains considerably restricted.
Another feature of capital controls in India is that foreign entities sometimes have more leeway
than domestic institutions in engaging in certain kinds of forward transactions.
2Jadhav (2003) provides a review of India’s experience with capital controls and capital account liberalization
through 2002. In general, like the RBI, Jadhav is relatively cautious about the benefits of such liberalization, and
sympathetic to a gradualist approach.
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2.2 Non-Deliverable Forward Market
A consequence of these capital controls is the development of a Non-Deliverable Forward (NDF)
market. An NDF market develops when the onshore forward markets are either not developed or
have restricted access (evidence of exposure requirements in the Indian case). These markets, which
are located offshore - i.e. in financial centers outside the country of the restricted currency - and
involve contract settlement without delivery in the restricted currency, allow offshore agents with
the restricted-currency exposures to hedge their exposures and speculators to take a position on the
expected changes in exchange rates or exchange rate regimes. Also active in the NDF markets are
arbitrageurs who have access to both forward markets. Volumes in the NDF market increase with
increasing interest or investment in the currency and with increasing restrictions on convertibility.
When currencies are fully convertible, NDF markets are not observed3.
The Indian rupee NDF market is most active in Singapore and Hong Kong, though there is also
trading in places such as Dubai. The dominant players in this market are the speculators who want
to take a position in the currency, and the arbitrageurs, mainly Indian exporters and importers
who have access to both the onshore forward market4 and the NDF market (Misra and Behera,
2006). The NDF rate therefore, serves as an important indicator of the expected future exchange
rate of the rupee. This rate also implies a corresponding interest rate, which is called the NDF
implied yield, calculated as follows:
r =
FN
S
(1 + i$)− 1 (1)
3Lipscomb (2005) provides a useful overview of NDF markets
4In August 2008, the Reserve Bank of India allowed trading on a domestic currency futures exchange to begin. Prior
to this innovation, trading for those permitted to do so was over-the-counter. Restrictions remain on participation
in the exchange, e.g. only Indian residents can participate.
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where S is the spot exchange rate of the US dollar in terms of rupee, FN is the NDF rate of a
certain maturity and i$ is the interest rate on dollar deposits of corresponding maturity (LIBOR
rates). Then, r is what the onshore yield would be, if there were no capital controls and if CIP
held. The (annualized) difference between the actual onshore yield (i, the MIBOR rate for the
corresponding maturity) and r is our measure of the covered interest parity differential. Without
restrictions on capital flows between two countries, deviations from covered interest parity (CIP),
which is basically a ”no-arbitrage” condition, would be small and simply reflect transactions costs.
Large and persistent positive onshore-offshore differentials (i−r), on the other hand, reflect effective
stemming of capital inflows and a negative differential suggests an effective stemming of capital
outflows. The speed with which deviations from CIP are eliminated is then an indicator of how
effective that arbitrage is between the two markets, and therefore of how effective the capital
controls are.
As described by Shah and Patnaik (2005), Indian banking regulations restrict banks’ ability to
arbitrage deviations from CIP. Although importers and exporters are allowed to use the onshore
forward market (‘permitted hedgers’), they do not themselves have the financial capabilities to
arbitrage as financial institutions would if permitted to do so. Hence, deviations from CIP persist
systematically5. At the same time, if there are some arbitrage avenues for market participants,
then the speed with which deviations from CIP are eliminated (or reduced) should be an indicator
5If forward rates are determined primarily by expected future currency needs from importers and exporters, rather
than by pure arbitrage, the direction of deviation from CIP can be an indicator of market expectations with respect
to future currency appreciation or depreciation. Shah and Patnaik (2005) give examples in India in 1993-94 and
1997-98 where expectations as implied by the direction of CIP deviation turned out to be incorrect. However, their
regression analysis indicates that, barring some outlier events, expectations of the direction of currency movements
as implied by CIP deviations have been correct on average.
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of how effective that arbitrage is in the actual working of the market.
3 Preliminary Analysis of the Data
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the annualized deviations from covered interest parity (CIP), as
defined in the previous section, calculated for NDF contracts and interest rates of 3-month ma-
turity6. The graph shows weekly observations, as well as six-week moving averages, starting in
January 1999 and ending in January 2008. Large and persistent deviations from CIP are evident,
indicating large transactions costs and the effectiveness of capital controls. At some points devia-
tions from CIP exceed 400 basis points. This indicates that, in the absence of capital controls and
transactions costs, an arbitrageur could have received over 40,000 USD per year for every 1 million
USD of volume transacted, without incurring any risk, or investing any money. Deviations of this
magnitude indicate that capital controls have affected these markets and hindered arbitrage and
market integration. In addition, it appears that restrictions on capital outflows (negative deviations
from CIP indicate that the MIBOR rate is lower than the offshore rate) are predominant during
1999-02, restrictions on inflows are predominant from 2003 to mid-2005, and fluctuate since that
time.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for CIP deviations for the full and sub-sample periods. The
largest negative deviation (foreign returns exceeding domestic returns) for the full sample is 7.88
percent per annum, and the largest positive deviation is 5.64 percent per annum. The mean absolute
deviation is 1.85 percent per annum.
6The data on NDF contracts is from Bloomberg and the MIBOR rates and sport rates are from Global Financial
Database and LIBOR rates are from Federal Reserve Board’s online database. Most inter-dealer transactions in the
NDF market are concentrated in two- to six-month maturities, and we follow Ma et al. (2004) in focusing on the
3-month maturity.
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Table 2 contains the results of Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) tests for evidence of unit root
behavior in the CIP deviation series and the two component interest rate series (the MIBOR
rate and the NDF-offshore implied yield). The results show that - as one would expect - that
the CIP differential series do not exhibit evidence of a unit root whereas the interest rate series
do. The fact that the CIP series are stationary indicates that when the deviations get too large,
arbitrage gradually reduce them towards zero. This very rough base line indicates that there
limits to geographic market segmentation. To get closer to a measure of the de facto strength
of capital controls, and especially the evolution of the strength of capital controls over time, we
analyze in Figure 2 the speed at which CIP deviations tend back towards zero in the context of
a linear autoregressive model. This is a preliminary analysis leading to our non-linear SETAR
model presented in the next section. We estimate two-year rolling regressions measuring the AR(1)
autoregressive parameter (and the +/-95% confidence bands) of the deviations from CIP. The
AR(1) parameter of the CIP series is a measure of how fast the series converges to a constant,
and when we measure it in a relatively short, two year window, we expect that it is a measure of
the level of arbitrage activity during that period7. The level of arbitrage activity is likely to be a
function of the costs to arbitrage, imposed by capital controls, and the profitability to arbitrage,
which is proportional to the magnitude of the deviation.
Figure 2 indicates substantial variation in arbitrage activity in this market. The AR(1) param-
eters appear to exhibit a cyclical pattern consistent with the notion that larger deviations from
CIP (thereby increasing the profitability to arbitrage) are associated with more rapid speed of ad-
justment towards zero, i.e. a lower AR(1) parameter. Three local minima in the AR(1) parameter
7An AR(1) parameter near one indicates a near unit root process where the time to adjust back to zero is nearly
infinite, whereas a measurement near zero indicates nearly instantaneous adjustment.
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are identified– early 2002, early 2005, and late 2007-that in turn correspond to periods of great-
est deviation from CIP seen in Figure 1 (note that the AR(1) parameter measured in late 2007
would have come from a regression on the previous 104 weeks of data). This pattern suggests that
arbitrage pressures have increased, with the AR(1) parameter declining towards the end of 2007.
The patterns we observe in these series point to the possibility that there are time-varying levels
of arbitrage that may increase as threshold levels of CIP violation are reached. They also suggest
the possibility that the degree to which capital controls bind arbitrage activity may have relaxed
over time. In particular, capital controls therefore appear to have become weaker over 2006-2007.
The preliminary analysis above suggests that there may be non-linearities as well as structural
breaks in the data. We formally test for non-linearities using the Tsay test (1989). The Tsay F-
statistic equals 4.1 (p-value= 0.01), hence strongly rejecting the null of linearity. Table 3 presents
the results of the Bai-Perron (2003) tests for structural change. The test indicates two structural
breaks, at January 2003 and April 2005, and we therefore estimate the SETAR model for three
sub-samples: January 1999 to January 2003; January 2003 to April 2005; and April 2005 to January
2008.
4 Self-Exciting Threshold Auto-Regression Tests of Capital Controls
4.1 SETAR Methodology
Deviations from CIP may exhibit non-linear properties that linear statistical methods are not able
to model. In particular, the presence of transaction costs and capital controls are likely to create
bands, within which arbitrage will not be profitable. Outside of the no-arbitrage boundaries, or
threshold values, arbitrage profit opportunities will be operative, with the strength of the return to
the no-arbitrage boundaries depending on the specifics of capital controls and other institutional
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factors. The band threshold values and the speeds of adjustment above and below the bands may
be asymmetric, reflecting the institutional specifics.
Linear models of deviations from CIP fail to take into account the possibility of bands, with
random deviations from CIP within the bands and systematic adjustment towards CIP outside of
the bands. The SETAR model is a particular class of piece-wise autoregressive models attributed
to Tong (1978). Surveys of TAR and SETAR models8, respectively, are given by Potter (1999)
and Hansen (1999). The SETAR model may be seen as a parsimonious approximation of a general
non-linear autoregressive model (Hansen, 1999). The SETAR model is an appropriate statistical
methodology for the problem we face in terms of bands and adjustment parameters. Various
SETAR models have been used in modeling industrial production, GDP, unemployment and, in
work closest to our own, on interest rate parity conditions (Pasricha, 2008) and cross-market premia
(Levy Yeyati, Schmukler and Van Horen, 2006)9.
The Self-Exciting Threshold Autoregressive (SETAR) model that we estimate in this section
allows for three regimes with differing autoregressive parameters and estimates the upper and lower
thresholds which divide the three. In addition, we estimate the model over two regimes to reflect
8As the names indicate, the SETAR model is a special case of the TAR model, in which regime-switch thresholds
depend on lagged values of the autoregressive variable itself.
9Pasricha’s study (2008) uses SETAR models to measure deviations from interest rate parity in 11 emerging market
economies and, outside of crisis periods, assumes parameter stability. Levy Yeyati, Schmukler and Van Horen (2006)
use data from nine emerging market economies to examine the ratio between the domestic and the international
market price of cross-listed stocks, thereby providing a valuable measure of international financial integration. Note
that the latter paper uses the general term TAR, but the model is in fact a SETAR model.
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pre- and post-liberalization of capital controls. We implemented the following SETAR model:
δt = ρiδt−1 + ǫit for κn < δt−1 < κp,
δt − κn = ρn(δt−1 − κn) + ǫnt for δt−1 ≤ κn,
δt − κp = ρp(δt−1 − κp) + ǫpt for δt−1 ≥ κp,
where δt is our onshore-offshore differential, ǫjt ∼ N(0, σ
2
j ), j = i, n, p and κn and κp are the
negative and positive thresholds respectively. A model of this form assumes that within the bounds
defined by and , speculative activity is not profitable because of transactions costs and capital
controls, so the differential inside the band may follow a unit root or otherwise non-stationary
process.
With sufficiently strong arbitrage activity, however, the AR(1) process outside the bands will
be stationary. This model assumes that speculative activity will push the deviations to the edges of
the band, rather than to its center. If the thresholds were known, the model could be estimated by
ordinary least squares applied separately to the inner and outer regime observations. The thresholds
are not known, however, and we employ a grid search over possible threshold combinations. All
the percentiles between the 5th and 95th percentiles are taken and separated into sets of negative
and positive threshold candidates. The selected model is that combination of negative and positive
threshold values that minimize the residual sum of squares. This estimation method is a type of
constrained least squares, and yields estimates that are consistent (see Hansen, 1999 and Pasricha,
2008).
4.2 SETAR Estimation Results
The SETAR estimates are reported in Tables 4 and 5. We focus on the three sub-samples, following
evidence reported above of structural breaks indicating three distinct regimes. Estimates of the
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lower- and upper-thresholds, and the bandwidth (no-arbitrage zones), are reported for the full
sample and three sub-samples in Table 4. The estimated speed of reversions and associated statistics
for each sample are reported in Table 5. The columns in Table 5 labeled ”OutObs,” ”LCR” and
”3rd Quartile” refer, respectively, to (1) the percentage of observations that lie outside of the no-
arbitrage band, (2) the longest continuous run outside of the band (i.e. the number of continuous
observations), and (3) the third quartile of the number of weeks that any run outside of the threshold
lasts. Figure 3 shows the results visually, with the upper and lower-thresholds shown for each sub-
sample together with the speed of reversion parameters and each observation (deviations from CIP)
plotted.
In terms of the no-arbitrage zones estimates, controls on capital outflows were predominant in
the January 1999 to January 2003 sample. Table 4 shows that the upper threshold is very close
to zero percent (i.e. no net effective restrictions on capital inflows), and -4.36 percent for the lower
threshold. (The bandwidth is 4.39). This indicates that foreign yields need to exceed domestic
yields by 436 basis points (annualized) to induce capital outflows from India. When the lower
threshold is exceeded, shown in Table 5, the speed of reversion is almost instantaneous. Arbitrage
is slower above the upper threshold, with an estimated AR(1) parameter equal to 0.68. (32 percent
of the CIP yield differential in favor of domestic assets is closed within one week)10. 22 percent of
the observations fall outside of the band (OutObs) and the longest continuous run outside of the
band (LCR) is 11 weeks. However, 75 percent of deviations outside the band (3rd Quartile) are
arbitraged away within two weeks.
A large shift in Indian capital flows towards financial liberalization appears in the second sample,
10An AR(1) parameter less than unity indicates mean reversion, i.e. CIP deviations outside of the band are
eliminated. A zero AR(1) parameter indicates immediate reversion to the band.
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January 2003 to April 2005, with some effective restrictions now evident on capital inflows. The
no-arbitrage band narrows appreciably to only 1.22 percent, with the lower threshold estimated to
be near zero and the upper threshold estimated at 1.22 percent. The speed of adjustment for CIP
deviations above (below) the upper (lower) threshold is 0.80 (0.59). Arbitrage appears effective
in eventually eliminating CIP deviations (outside the bands). Given the narrow bandwidth, it is
not surprising that 83 percent of the observations fall outside of the no-arbitrage zone and that
the longest run outside of the band is 38 weeks. 75 percent of deviations outside the band are
arbitraged away within four weeks.
Capital controls appear to be intensified somewhat in the third sub-sample, April 2005 to
January 2008, and again are more restrictive on capital inflows. The bandwidth is 2.37 percent,
the upper threshold is 1.61 and the lower threshold is -0.76. The speed of adjustment for deviations
above the band increases sharply (the AR(1) parameter declines) in the third sub-sample, and is
effectively instantaneous, while the speed of adjustment below the band also increases somewhat
(AR(1)=0.44). 55 percent of the observations fall outside of the no-arbitrage zone and that the
longest run outside of the band is 20 weeks. 75 percent of deviations outside the band are arbitraged
away within four weeks.
Overall, the bandwidth is much narrower in the second and third sub-samples than in the
first sample, indicating substantial de facto weakening of capital controls in India over the sample
period11. This finding is reflected in the summary statistics, shown in Table 1, which show the mean
absolute CIP deviation has declined from 1.94 during January 1999-January 2003 to 1.32 during
11This result is consistent with Ma and McCauley (2008) who regress the mean absolute deviations (weekly data)
from CIP (12-month instruments) on three dummy variables representing different periods of time. The most recent
period (July 2005-June 2008) has the lowest coefficient estimate, i.e. the lowest mean absolute value. Their sub-
samples are not determined by structural break tests.
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April 2005-January 2008. Moreover, the threshold estimates indicate a switch from strict controls
on capital outflows in the early sample to moderate restrictions on inflows in the latter periods12.
Weak restrictions on inflows, possibly the result of transaction costs rather than capital controls,
are also evident in the most recent sample period. All of the adjustment parameters indicate
mean reversion to the upper or lower thresholds of the no-arbitrage band. These adjustments vary
depending on whether the deviations are above or below the band and on the particular sub-sample.
These changes in the speed of adjustment reflect the interaction of both capital controls and
market structure/liquidity, but clearly indicate that strong forces for market arbitrage are evident
that eliminate CIP deviations once they exceed a particular threshold. Average daily turnover of
NDF contracts in the Indian Rupee increased from about $35 million USD in mid-2001 to $3.7 billion
USD in early 2007 (Ma et al., 2004; Misra and Behera, 2006), indicating that market liquidity has
increased markedly with presumably stronger pressures for market arbitrage. Moreover, we would
expect volume quantity restrictions on capital inflows and outflows to have a larger impact on the
speed of adjustment, while taxes on flows are more likely to increase bandwidths. The complex
nature of Indian capital controls, discretionary application over time and their lack of transparency,
do not allow us to disentangle these effects.
5 Summary and Conclusions
This paper has investigated the effectiveness of Indian capital controls in creating a wedge between
domestic and foreign implied yields using NDF rates (deviations from CIP). Our objective is to test
12For example, in 2007, increased portfolio inflows and FDI led to efforts by the Reserve Bank of India to limit capital
inflows to avoid rupee appreciation, as well as a relaxation of restrictions on certain kinds of outflows. Expectations of
rupee appreciation may be reflected in the sign of the CIP differential (Shah and Patnaik, 2005). Another component
of policy during this period was the sterilization of inflows, resulting in reserve accumulation.
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whether the incremental moves to liberalize India’s capital controls in recent years have effectively
narrowed the barriers to capital inflows and outflows. In this context, we postulate the existence
of no-arbitrage bands where the boundaries are determined by transactions costs and limitations
to arbitrage due to capital controls, and CIP deviations are random within the boundaries. Using
structural break tests, we divide the sample into three sub-samples and estimate the effects of
liberalization on the threshold boundaries of the no-arbitrage band and speeds of adjustment. A
narrowing of the bands over time is an indication of greater de facto capital account openness, as
is an increase in the speed of adjustment to the band threshold points (indicating arbitrage acts
more rapidly in returning the market closer to CIP). Inside of the bands, small deviations from
CIP follow a process close to a random walk. Outside the bands, profitable and feasible arbitrage
opportunities exist, and we estimate an adjustment process back towards the boundaries. We
allow for asymmetric boundaries and asymmetric speeds of adjustment (above and below the band
thresholds), which may vary depending on how arbitrage activity is constrained by capital controls.
We estimate this non-linear model with the self exciting threshold auto-regressions (SETAR)
methodology in order to simultaneously obtain consistent estimates of a non-arbitrage band (upper
and lower threshold points) and speeds of adjustment (possibly asymmetric) to the boundaries.
Outside the thresholds, all of our estimates indicate relatively rapid or instantaneous convergence.
This pattern is consistent with the contention that capital controls imply a cost of arbitrage or
induce riskiness to the arbitrage position. These unseen costs or risks induce a threshold effect
where arbitrage will only become profitable (on a risk adjusted basis) outside a given level of CIP
deviation.
In terms of the effects of India’s liberalization of capital controls, our results indicate a significant
reduction in the barriers to arbitrage from the pre-2003 period to the post-2003 period. Moreover,
15
there has been a sharp switch in the direction of capital controls. In the pre-2003 period, controls
were binding and substantial on capital outflows. Controls were reduced substantially after 2003
and the remaining restrictions (through early 2008) were mainly binding on capital inflows. In
all regimes, we find that adjustment towards CIP is quite rapid outside of the threshold values.
Overall, liberalization of capital controls in India has occurred in tandem with the development of
domestic money and offshore markets and increases in market liquidity.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics, CIP Differential
Full Sample Jan 1999- Jan 2003- April 2005-
Jan 2003 April 2005 Jan 2008
Minimum -7.88 -7.88 -3.69 -4.69
Maximum 5.64 1.58 5.54 3.86
Mean Absolute Spread 1.85 1.94 2.26 1.32
19
Table 2. ADF Unit Root Tests
Variable Lags ADF Stat. p-value
NDF BIC 3 -2.28 0.18
AIC 8 -2.04 0.27
MIBOR BIC 0 -1.76 0.4
AIC 0 · · · · · ·
CIP Differential BIC 1 -4.96∗∗∗ 0
AIC 8 -2.80∗ 0.06
Note. — Lags chosen by BIC and AIC criterion, Null hypoth-
esis is of unit root.* 10 %, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance.
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Table 3. Bai-Perron Tests
Method : Sequential F - test
SupF(l+1|l) : SupFT(2|1) SupFT(3|2) SupFT(4|3) SupFT(5|4)
20.49∗∗∗ 12.71∗ 7.30 12.71
Number of Breaks Selected : 2
Break Date 1 : 11 January 2003
Confidence Interval : November 2002 - March 2003
Break Date 2 : 9 April 2005
Confidence Interval : November 2004 - June 2005
Note. — The SupF(l+1—l) test is a sequential proceedure developed in Bai and Perron (2003) which
sequentially tests for l+1 breaks vs. the null of l breaks until the null can no longer be rejected. The BIC
information criteria selection procedure used in Bai and Perron (unreported) also selects two breaks in
our data, though that proceedure does not give dates. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance.
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Table 4. Estimated No-Arbitrage Zones
Begin Date End Date Thresholds Bandwidth
Negative Postive
Full Sample 30-Jan-99 30-Jan-08 -4.07 3.49 7.56
Sub Sample 1 30-Jan-99 11-Jan-03 -4.36 0.03 4.39
Sub Sample 2 25-Jan-03 2-Apr-05 0.00 1.22 1.22
Sub Sample 3 16-Apr-05 30-Jan-08 -0.76 1.61 2.37
Note. — Thresholds estimated from SETAR models with one AR lag in each regime.
A BIC criterion was employed for testing for optimal lags between 1 and 8 weeks. For
all samples other than 3-month full sample, BIC criterion selected an AR(1) process. For
3-month full sample results, the BIC criterion selected 3 lags, but the BIC statistics for 1
and 3 lags were almost identical. We chose lag 1 for consistency with the other models.
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Table 5. Speed of Reversion Statistics
OutObs LCR 3rd Inner Negative Positive
% Quartile Regime Regime Regime
AR(1) Std. Error AR(1) Std. Error AR(1) Std. Error
Full Sample 11 7 3 0.89 0.03 -0.03 0.21 -0.04 0.22
Sub Sample 1 22 11 2 1.02 0.05 -0.16 0.22 0.68 0.15
Sub Sample 2 83 38 4 1.78 0.26 0.59 0.23 0.8 0.07
Sub Sample 3 55 20 4 0.59 0.2 0.44 0.12 -0.01 0.31
Note. — OutObs is the percentage of deviations in the outer regimes. LCR is the longest continuous run outside any
threshold and 3rd Quartile is the third quartile of continuous runs outside thresholds. Non-positive parameter values indicate
instantaneous convergence to the threshold.
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Figure 1: CIP Deviation Series
24
Figure 2: Plot of AR(1) parameter from rolling regressions on CIP deviation series Two-year (104
weeks) rolling regression windows (dotted lines are +/-95% errors)
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Figure 3: CIP Deviations and Estimated Thresholds
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